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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Angela Marie Boehm appeals from the district court's intermediate
appellate decision affirming her convictions for misdemeanor driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUI) and driving without privileges (DWP).

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Law enforcement responded to a two-vehicle crash after 10 pm on
January 10, 2013.

(R., p.22.)

vehicle was hit by a pickup.

Boehm "slid through" a stop sign before her

(R., p.21.)

Boehm repeatedly turned away from

Officer Neal as he was attempting to talk to her. (Id.) He observed Boehm was
"swaying back and forth" and "slurring her words" while she was talking on her
phone.

(Id.)

The officer could smell "the strong odor of alcoholic beverage

emanating" from Boehm when he standing downwind from her.

(Id.)

Boehm

admitted to drinking just one beer some three hours earlier. (Id.)

Boehm failed

the field sobriety tests and was taken into custody. (R., pp.21-22.) Once at the
police station, the officer observed Boehm for the "required observation period"
and read her the ALS form.

(R., p.22.)

After indicating she understood her

rights, Boehm provided a breath alcohol sample with a .192/.183 result.
p.22.)

(R.,

Upon discovering Boehm's driver's license was suspended for unpaid

tickets, the police officer issued her citations for DUI and DWP. (R., p.22.)
Boehm filed multiple motions before the trial court, including a motion to
suppress, in limine, to sever, and to compel. (R., pp.33-53, 57-72.) Following a
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hearing on the motions, the trial court denied them all, including Boehm's motion
to sever her charges for purposes of jury trial, finding no undue prejudice to
Boehm in joining for trial a DWP and DUI charge which arose out of the same
incident. (Tr., p.4, Ls.8-25.)
Boehm's motion to compel "basically request[ed] [] that [the state] have a
copy of the maintenance logs" relating to the lntoxilyzer used in Boehm's BAC
test available "in their office." (Tr., p.7, Ls.18-20.) In its discretion, the trial court
denied Boehm's motion to compel holding that the state had the duty under Rule
16 to respond to the discovery requests and had done that.

(Tr., p.12, L.2 -

p.14, L.12.) The court concluded the state's direction to Boehm as to where the
items requested could be located in addition to making them available for
Boehm's review was sufficient compliance with the rule:
I don't find that the City Prosecuting Attorney, under the
circumstances of this case, has an affirmative duty to go and obtain
all of those documents, since they're not within the possession and
control of the City, and then turn them over, so that they can be
reviewed by the defense.
The defense, if they think that those documents are
necessary, can certainly make arrangements to view the
documents, obtain copies of the documents from the appropriate
agency, or subpoena any of the documents, if need be, to a hearing
or trial.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.13-23.)
Boehm's motion in /!mine moved the court to preclude the state from
introducing any evidence of her BAC results at trial, contending the failure of the
Idaho State Police (ISP) to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the Idaho
Administrative

Procedures Act (IDAPA)

2

in

adopting

Standard

Operating

(SOPs)
un

other

for breath testing "makes all such testing

use at a criminal

I.C. §18-8004." (R., p.44.)

The

court denied the motion in limine without prejudice, reserving the issue for trial.
(Tr., p.16, L.6- p.19, L25.)
Boehm entered into negotiations for a conditional guilty plea, reserving the
right on appeal to challenge the denial of her motions to sever, to compel, to
suppress, and in limine.

(Tr., p.67, Ls.2-6.)

At the time set for sentencing,

Boehm argued to withdraw her guilty plea based on a recent United States
Supreme Court decision.

(R., pp.209-21 O; Tr., p.67, Ls.19-22.)

The court

denied Boehm's motion to withdraw her plea, maintained Boehm's conditional
plea and imposed sentence. (Tr., p.76., Ls.1-6, p.82, L.2- p.83, L.5; R., pp.224228, 235-236.)

Boehm timely appealed to the district court (R, pp.231-234),

which affirmed (R, pp.359-360). Boehm again timely appeals. (R, pp.361-365.)
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ISSUES
issues on

as:

The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding
that a joint trial of a driving without privileges offense with a
driving under the influence offense would not result in unfair
prejudice to the defendant.
II.

The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding
that the state had not violated the defendant's constitutional
rights by refusing to seek out various documents and turn
them over to the defendant per request.

111.

The District Court erred in finding that the defendant's
Motion in Limine was not properly preserved for appeal.

IV.

The Magistrate Court and District Court erred in not finding
that no method for the administration of evidentiary testing
exists as required by I.C. § 18-8004 and therefore the results
of the evidentiary test must be excluded in this case.

V.

The District Court erred in upholding the Magistrate's finding
that McNeely did not create newly discovered law such that
allowing the defendant to withdraw her plea was just.

(Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Has Boehm failed to show the magistrate abused its discretion in
denying her motion to sever?
2. Has Boehm failed to show error in the magistrate's denial of her motion
to compel?
3. Has Boehm failed to establish any basis for the reversal of her
conviction based on her claim that ISP has failed to establish methods to ensure
the reliability of BAC test results?
4. Has Boehm filed to show error in the denial of her motion to withdraw
her guilty plea?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Boehm Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Sever

A

Introduction
Boehm argued the court should sever her DWP and DUI charges for

purposes of jury trial because "there was a grave risk that the jury may find that
the defendant, being the 'type' of person who ignores license suspensions, would
also be the type of person who would drive while intoxicated." (Appellant's brief,
p.11.)

The state argued below that severance of the charges was improper

because they were "within the same act or transaction." (Tr., p.4, Ls.5-6.) The
trial court in its discretion denied the motion to sever finding no prejudice would
result where the DUI and DWP charges arose from the same driving conduct.
(Tr., p.4, Ls.8-25.) Application of the relevant law to the facts of this case shows
no error.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

kl

"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
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the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

kl

(citing Losser, 145

Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981)).
Whether counts are properly joined is a question of law given free review.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007). A motion to sever
properly joined counts because of prejudice, however, is directed to the trial
court's discretion.

kl at 564-65,

165 P.3d at 278-79; State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho

903, 907, 55 P.3d 896, 900 (Ct. App. 2002).

C.

The Magistrate Court Properly Denied Boehm's Motion To Sever The
Trials Of Her Driving Without Privileges And Driving Under The Influence
Charges
Counts are properly joined in a single charging document if they are either

"based on the same act or transaction" or, if based on different acts or
transactions, those acts or transactions are "connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan." I.C.R. 8(a). "Two crimes are 'connected'
together if the proof of one crime constitutes a substantial portion of the proof of
the other."
1984).

United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 776 (11 th Cir.,

"In determining whether the connection between the acts charged is

sufficient to meet the requirements of joinder under Rule 8(a), the court should
be guided by the extent of evidentiary overlap." United States v. Berardi, 675
F.2d 894, 899-900 (J1h Cir., 1982). "Whether joinder is proper is determined by
what is alleged, not what the proof eventually shows." Field, 144 Idaho at 565,
165 P.3d at 279.
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icial efficiency and "conserve state

joinder is
d

and public authorities, and

to

delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial." United States v. Lane, 474
U.S. 438, 449 (1986) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134
(1968)). For these reasons, federal courts and other state courts broadly
construe their nearly identical rules in favor of joinder.

United States v. Rock,

282 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting federal rule 8(a) is broadly construed in
favor of joinder); State v. Reeder, 182 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(noting that "liberal joinder" is favored in the interest of judicial economy).
The trial court's determination that the charges were based on the same
act or transaction is correct. Boehm was contacted by police after being involved
in a vehicle crash. Her driving is the basis for both charges. Boehm has failed to
show that the district court erred by concluding the counts were properly joined.
Even where charges are properly joined, however, a motion to sever may
still be granted if the party making the motion demonstrates prejudice from trying
the charged counts together.

I.C.R. 14. "When reviewing an order denying a

motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is whether the defendant has presented
facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from a joint trial, which denied
the defendant a fair trial." State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908, 55 P.3d 896,
901 (Ct. App. 2002).

The potential sources of unfair prejudice from denial of

severance are that the jury may have confused and cumulated evidence; the
potential the defense was confounded in presenting a defense; and the
possibility the jury convicted based on bad character instead of the evidence

7

presented.

kl

A defendant moving to sever has the burden of showing the

district court that joinder is prejudicial. State v. Dambrell, 120 Idaho 532, 537,
817 P.2d 646, 651 (1991).

Even where joinder is ultimately deemed improper,

harmless error analysis applies. State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 362, 63 P .3d
485, 488 (Ct. App. 2003).
Boehm has also shown no prejudice from the proper joinder. The district
court concluded that no defenses would be compromised and appropriate jury
instructions would minimize any potential prejudice. (Tr., p.4, Ls.16-24.) Boehm
simply disagrees with the court's conclusion and the jury's ability to follow
instructions.

(Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.)

Boehm has failed to show actual

prejudice, and therefore failed to show any abuse of discretion.

11.
Boehm Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Denying Her Motion To Compel Discovery
A.

Introduction
Boehm argues the district court erred when it upheld the trial court's

"finding that no violation of the defendant's right to Due Process when the
prosecutor did not seek out possibly exculpatory evidence to review and refused
to provide copies to the defendant."
fails.

(Appellant's brief, p.12.)

Boehm's claim

The trial court correctly concluded the state complied with I.C.R. 16 by

disclosing the requested information and as such, did not abuse its discretion in
denying Boehm's motion to compel.
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Standard Of Review
of
in its

to a

by a district court

iate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I. B., supra, and is

incorporated herein by reference.
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether or not to grant a
motion to compel. See I.C.R. 16(k); Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 700,
116 P.3d 27, 30 (2005); Storm v. Spaulding, 137 Idaho 145, 149, 44 P.3d 1200,
1204 (Ct. App. 2002).

C.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded The State Had Met Its Discovery
Requirements Under I.C.R. 16
I.C.R. 16 provides upon the request of a defendant,
the prosecuting attorney shall permit the defendant to inspect and
copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, buildings, or places, or copies or portions thereof,
which are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecuting
attorney and which are material to the preparation of the defense,
or intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial, ...

I.C.R. 16(b)(4).
Boehm filed a motion to compel the production of seven separate items,
asserting they had not been "turned over to the defendant." (R., p.50.) Five of
those items are at issue on appeal:
2. A copy of the manual of procedures governing the
administration of breath tests at the Kootenai County Public Safety
Building.
3. The date of any repairs or maintenance performed on the
lntoxilyzer 68-013328 used in this matter to test the defendant's
blood alcohol, during the three months prior to the testing of the
defendant, and the nature of any such repairs.
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4. The date of any repairs or maintenance performed on the
lntoxilyzer 68-013328 used to test the defendant's blood alcohol,
from the date of testing of the defendant up to the date of trial, and
the nature of such repairs or maintenance.
5. The number of times within the last two years that the
lntoxilyzer 68-013328 used to test the defendant's breath has been
tested to determine its ability to detect acetone or other
"interferants," and the result of any such tests.
6. A copy of any repair or maintenance log kept with regard
to the machine which was used to test the defendant's breath or
blood.
(R., pp.50-51.) In its response to Boehm's motion to compel, the state recounted
its previous responses to Boehm's discovery requests which included directing
Boehm to schedule appointments with specified agencies or the prosecutor's
office to inspect the requested materials. (See R., pp.53-56 (Plaintiff's Response
to Defendant's Motion to Compel).)
The trial court denied Boehm's motion to compel, finding the state
complied with I.C.R. 16 by making the requested documents available to Boehm.
(Tr., p.11, L.23 - p.14, L.18.) Boehm concedes the state was not required by
rule or statute to copy and deliver the requested documents to her. (Appellant's
brief, p.14.) She argues, however, that because it is not a burden for the state to
provide such documents to defendants, failing to do so "is a violation of the
defendant's

right to effective

assistance of counsel

and

due

process."

(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) It is not the state's responsibility to gather evidence
for a defendant or investigate his or her case. State v. Bryant, 127 Idaho 24, 28,
896 P.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1995); Queen v. State, 146 Idaho 502, 506, 198
P.3d 731, 735 (Ct. App. 2008).

Although Boehm asserts the evidence she
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requested was "plainly possibly exculpatory evidence" (Appellant's brief, p.13),
she does not indicate how that would require a higher burden on the state than
complying with ICf ,16.
Boehm has failed to show the state was not in compliance with ICR 16
C

<

c

and therefore has failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her motion to compel.
111.
Boehm Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversal Based On Her Claim That
ISP Has Failed To Establish Methods To Ensure The Reliability Of BAC Test
Results

A

Introduction
Boehm argues the trial court erred in conditionally denying her motion in

limine seeking to exclude evidence at trial of her breath alcohol level without

making a finding on the underlying issue.

(Appellant's brief, p.16.)

Boehm

contends the lower courts erred by not "finding that a violation of I.C. § 18-8004
(4) would prevent the admission of breath test results because the statute plainly
requires that a method exist for the testing of the breath." (Id.)
Specifically, Boehm asserts that her breath test results were inadmissible,
and should have been ruled as such prior to trial, because the failure of ISP to
comply with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in creating SOPs and
manuals for breath alcohol testing renders those SOPs and manuals void and all
BAC testing based on those standards too unreliable for use at a criminal trial.
(Appellant's brief, pp.18-24.)
This argument fails for several alternative reasons. Initially, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by deferring ruling on the admissibility of
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evidence until trial.

If this Court reaches the merits of Boehm's claims even

though not ruled on by the trial court, these claims for three reasons.

First,

nothing in I.C. § 18-8004(4) requires formal rulemaking as a prerequisite to the
admissibility of results of breath tests performed pursuant to methods approved
by ISP. Second, if ISP's creation of the SOPs is agency action governed by the
requirements of the IAPA, Boehm's exclusive means for challenging such action
was through the judicial review provisions of the IAPA; she has no standing to
raise, and neither the lower courts nor this Court have jurisdiction to consider, a
challenge to the validity of the SOPs as a basis for excluding breath test results
in a criminal case. Finally, correct application of the law shows the SOPs are not
rules and, as such, no compliance with the formal rulemaking requirements of the
IAPA was required.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district court

in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., supra, and is
incorporated herein by reference.
"When a decision on a motion addressing the admissibility of evidence is
challenged, [the appellate court] defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact
supported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho
134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied. Questions of law, including
whether the state has satisfied the foundational requirements for the admission
of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, are subject to free review. State v.
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Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 452, 988 P.2d 225, 226 (Ct. App. 1999); State v.
Remsburg. 126 Idaho 338, 339, 882 P.2d 993. 994 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Boehm's Motion In Umine Pending The
Introduction Of Relevant Evidence At Trial
In reviewing Boehm's motion in limine, the trial court read the motion to be

a challenge to the reliability of the test results and whether or not Boehm's breath
alcohol content should be admitted at trial. (Tr., p.17, Ls.17-20.) Because that
was a foundational question properly addressed at trial, the court denied the
motion to see "how that evidence comes in, and if it comes in, how the jury
weighs it in light of the [sic] some of the arguments that have been presented."
(Tr., p.18, Ls.10-12.)
In State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 930 P.2d 1039 (Ct. App. 1996), the Idaho
Court of Appeals stated, "It is within the discretion of the trial court to rule on a
motion in limine prior to trial or to withhold a decision on the motion until the
evidence is offered at trial." The Court explained the rationale for this discretion
as follows:
Because a motion in limine is based on an alleged or anticipated
factual scenario, without the benefit of all the other actual evidence
which will be admitted at trial, the trial judge will not always be able
to make an informed decision regarding the admissibility of
evidence prior to the time the evidence is actually presented at trial.
It is often difficult, and sometimes impossible, for the trial judge to
make a proper ruling without the benefit of all the other evidence
admitted at trial . . .. The trial judge, in the exercise of his
discretion, may decide that it is inappropriate to rule in advance on
the admissibility of evidence based on a motion in limine, but may
defer his ruling until the case unfolds and there is a better record
upon which to make his decision.
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Q.QQ.Q, 129 Idaho at 603-604, 930 P.2d at 1045-1046 (quoting State v. Hester,
114 Idaho 688, 699-700, 760 P.2d 27, 38-39 (1988), and citing State v. Stuart,
110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1986), overruled on other grounds, State v. Tribe,
123 Idaho 721, 725 n.4, 852 P.2d 87, 91 n.4 (1993)).
The trial court in this case declined to make a pretrial ruling on the
admissibility of certain evidence prior to trial because it was concerned that the
evidence presented at trial would affect the admissibility of the evidence of
Boehm's breath alcohol level. The court's decision to defer its ruling until trial
was entirely proper. Boehm has failed to establish otherwise.

D.

If This Court Considers The Underlying Argument Of Admissibility, Boehm
Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Excluding Her Breath Test Results
Based On Her Claim That ISP Did Not Comply With The Formal
Rulemaking Requirements Of The IAPA In Adopting The SOPs For Breath
Alcohol Testing
1.

Nothing In I.C. § 18-8004(4) Requires Compliance With The
Rulemaking Requirements Of The IAPA As A Prerequisite To The
Admissibility Of Results Of BAG Testing Performed Pursuant To
Methods Approved By ISP

Idaho's DUI statute states it is unlawful for a person with "an alcohol
concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as
shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle" on a road or place open to the public.

I.C. § 18-

8004(1 )(a). Subsection (4 ), in turn, sets forth a formula of grams of alcohol per
210 liters of breath upon which upon which "an evidentiary test for alcohol
concentration shall be based" and states that such breath tests shall be
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or
state

" I

§ 1

any

method approved

the

subsection continues:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the
results of any test for alcohol concentration and records relating to
calibration, approval, certification or quality control performed by a
laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho state police or by any
other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be
admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing
procedure for examination.
I.C. § 18-8004(4).
As contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4), ISP has approved certain methods
for breath alcohol testing and standards for the administration of such tests, and
those approved methods have been set out by ISP in the form of "Standard
Operating Procedures" and training manuals (hereinafter collectively "SOPs").
(See R., pp.34-123, 138-236); State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 140, 306 P.3d
219, 225 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied.

Boehm does not contend that, in

administering her breath test, Officer Neal failed to comply with any of the
methods or procedures set forth in the SOPs. Rather, she argues the methods
themselves are invalid because there is nothing in the record indicating that ISP
complied with the rulemaking procedures of the IAPA, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., in
adopting the SOPs.

(Appellant's brief, pp.18-24.)

Boehm's challenge to the

manner in which ISP approved the methods for breath alcohol testing does not
show any basis for exclusion of her breath test results because nothing in the
governing law requires compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA
as a prerequisite to the admissibility of results of BAG testing performed pursuant
to methods approved by ISP.
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Pmmulgation of rules is required under the IAPA only where "specifically
authorized by statute."

i.C. § 67-5231(1).

The plain language of I.C. § 18-

8004(4) states that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court,"
results of BAC testing "shall be admissible," without the necessity of producing
expert testimony, if the test was "performed by a laboratory operated or approved
by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state

police." (Emphasis added). Nothing in this statute authorizes or requires ISP to
comply with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the methods
for determining an individual's breath alcohol concentration, nor does the statute
make compliance with the IAPA a condition precedent to the admissibility of BAC
test results in a criminal proceeding. To the contrary, the statute provides that
such results are admissible if the test was performed by "any . . . method
approved by" ISP. I.C. § 18-8004(4). Because Boehm has never argued, much
less demonstrated, that Officer Neal failed to comply with any of the methods set
out in the SOPs in administering her breath test, she has failed to show any basis
for exclusion of her test results in the criminal case.
The state recognizes the legislature has conferred rulemaking authority
upon ISP for purposes of administrative license suspension proceedings.
Specifically, I.C. § 18-8002A provides:
(3) Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho
state police may, pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code,
prescribe by rule:
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under
this section; and
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What
or
of
must
performed to comply with the department's requirements. Any
rules of
Idaho state
shall be in accordance with the
following: a test for alcohol concentration in breath as defined in
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and subsection (1) (e) of this section
will be valid for the purposes of this section if the breath alcohol
testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state
police in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time
within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing ....
I.C. § 18-8002A(3).

By its plain language, however, the rulemaking authority

granted by I.C. § 18-8002A does not extend to the approval of methods for
breath alcohol testing contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4). To the contrary, the
statute limits what ISP may prescribe by rule to the determinations of "[w]hat
testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this section [18-8002A]"
and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to
comply with the department's requirements." The statute also mandates that any
rule so prescribed recognize that, for purposes of the license suspension
provisions of I.C. § 18-8002A, a test for breath alcohol concentration is valid "if
the breath alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state
police in accordance with section 18-8004." In so doing, the legislature clearly
indicated that the approval of breath testing equipment and methods required
under I.C. § 18-8004 is not itself subject to the rulemaking requirements of the
IAPA.
Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not require that ISP approve BAG testing
methods by formal rulemaking.

Therefore, Boehm's argument that the SOPs

were not adopted pursuant to the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is
irrelevant to the admissibility of her breath test results under this section.
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If ISP's Creation Of The SOPs Is Agency Action Governed By The
Requirements Of The IAPA, Boehm's Exclusive Means For
Challenging Such Action Was Through The Judicial Review
Provisions Of The !APA
Boehm argues that, because administrative license suspension hearings
"held per I.G. § 18-8002A are agency action controlled by [the IAPA]," ISP's
approval of methods for BAG testing for purposes of admissibility of test results
under I.G. § 18-8004(4) must also be "agency action falling under the
requirements of [the IAPA]." (Appellant's brief, p.23.) Boehm has failed to show
that ISP's compliance or lack thereof with the formal rulemaking requirements of
the IAPA is at all relevant to the determination of the admissibility of her breath
test results under I.C. § 18-8004(4).
Nothing In I.G. § 18-8004(4) requires compliance with the rulemaking
requirements of the IAPA as a prerequisite to the admissibility of results of BAG
testing performed pursuant to methods approved by ISP.

Idaho's DUI statute

states it is unlawful for a person with "an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as
defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his
blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle"
on a road or place open to the public. I.G. § 18-8004(1 )(a). Subsection (4), in
turn, sets forth a formula of grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath upon which
upon which "an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be based" and
states that such breath tests shall be performed by an approved laboratory or "by
any other method approved by the Idaho state police." I.G. § 18-8004(4). That
subsection continues:
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any
of law or rule of
results of any test
alcohol concentration and records relating to
, approval, certification or quality control performed by a
laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho
or
other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be
admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing
procedure for examination.

I.C. § 18-8004(4).
As contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4), ISP has approved certain methods
for breath alcohol testing and standards for the administration of such tests, and
those approved methods have been set out by ISP in the form of "Standard
Operating Procedures" and training manuals (hereinafter collectively "SOPs").
(See R., pp.34-123, 138-236); State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 140, 306 P.3d
219, 225 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied.

Boehm does not contend that, in

administering her breath test, Officer Neal failed to comply with any of the
methods or procedures set forth in the SOPs. Rather, she argues the methods
themselves are invalid because there is nothing in the record indicating that ISP
complied with the rulemaking procedures of the IAPA, I.C. § 67-5201 et seq., in
adopting the SOPs.

(Appellant's brief, pp.18-24.)

Boehm's challenge to the

manner in which ISP approved the methods for breath alcohol testing does not
show any basis for exclusion of her breath test results because nothing in the
governing law requires compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA
as a prerequisite to the admissibility of results of BAC testing performed pursuant
to methods approved by ISP.
Promulgation of rules is required under the IAPA only where "specifically
authorized by statute."

I.C. § 67-5231(1).
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The plain language of I.C. § 18-

8004(4) states that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court,"
results of BAC testing "shall be admissible," without the necessity of producing
expert testimony, if the test was "performed by a laboratory operated or approved
by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state

police." (Emphasis added). Nothing in this statute authorizes or requires ISP to
comply with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the methods
for determining an individual's breath alcohol concentration, nor does the statute
make compliance with the IAPA a condition precedent to the admissibility of BAC
test results in a criminal proceeding. To the contrary, the statute provides that
such results are admissible if the test was performed by "any . . . method
approved by" ISP. I.C. § 18-8004(4). Because Boehm has never argued, much
less demonstrated, that Officer Neal failed to comply with any of the methods set
out in the SOPs in administering her breath test, she has failed to show any basis
for exclusion of her test results in the criminal case.
The state recognizes the legislature has, in a related statute, conferred
rulemaking authority upon ISP for purposes of administrative license suspension
proceedings. Specifically, I.C. § 18-8002A provides:
(3) Rulemaking authority of the Idaho state police. The Idaho
state police may, pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code,
prescribe by rule:
(a) What testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under
this section; and
(b) What calibration or checking of testing equipment must be
performed to comply with the department's requirements. Any
rules of the Idaho state police shall be in accordance with the
following: a test for alcohol concentration in breath as defined in
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and subsection (1) (e) of this section
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will be valid for the purposes of this section if the breath alcohol
testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state
police in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, at any time
within ninety (90) days before the evidentiary testing ....
I.C. § 18-8002A(3).

By its plain language, however, the rulemaking authority

granted by I.C. § 18-8002A does not extend to the approval of methods for
breath alcohol testing contemplated by I.C. § 18-8004(4). To the contrary, the
statute limits what ISP may prescribe by rule to the determinations of "[w]hat
testing is required to complete evidentiary testing under this section [18-8002A]"
and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed to
comply with the department's requirements." The statute also mandates that any
rule so prescribed recognize that, for purposes of the license suspension
provisions of I.C. § 18-8002A, a test for breath alcohol concentration is valid "if
the breath alcohol testing instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho state
police in accordance with section 18-8004." In so doing, the legislature clearly
indicated that the approval of breath testing equipment and methods required
under I.C. § 18-8004 is not itself subject to the rulemaking requirements of the
IAPA.
Idaho Code § 18-8004 does not require that ISP approve BAC testing
methods by formal rulemaking.

Therefore, Boehm's argument that the SOPs

were not adopted pursuant to the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA is
irrelevant to the admissibility of her breath test results under this section.
If Boehm is correct, however - and ISP's approval of BAC testing methods
for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004(4) is agency action governed by the IAPA Boehm had no standing to bring, and neither the lower courts nor this Court have
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no jurisdiction to consider, a challenge to the manner in which ISP approved BAC
testing methods as a basis for excluding the breath test result in the criminal
case.
"Actions by state agencies are not subject to judicial review unless
expressly authorized by statute." Laughy v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 149 Idaho
867, 870, 243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010) (citing I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1)); Johnson v.
State, 153 Idaho 246, 250, 280 P.3d 749, 753 (2012) (same). Idaho Code§ 675270 permits judicial review of final agency actions, including the failure of an
agency to "issue a rule" or "to perform, any duty placed on it by law." See I.C. §
67-5201 (3) (definition of "Agency action"); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 871, 243 P.3d at
1059 (summarizing "types of agency actions that could be reviewed by a court").
However, in order to be entitled to such review, the "person aggrieved by final
agency action" must comply with the procedural requirements of I.C. §§ 67-5271
through 67-5279. I.C. § 67-5270(2); BV Beverage Co., LLC v. State, 155 Idaho
624, 627, 315 P.3d 812, 815 (2013); Laughy, 149 Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at
1058.

Where, as here, the aggrieved person is challenging the validity of a

"rule," compliance with the procedural requirements necessary to obtain judicial
review requires the person to, among other things: exhaust all available
administrative remedies (I.C. § 67-5271), institute proceedings for review or
declaratory judgment by filing a petition in the district court of the county in which
the final agency action was taken or where the aggrieved person resides (I.C. §
67-5272(1)), file the petition within two years of the adoption of the rule being
challenged (I.C. §§ 67-5231 and 67-5273), and make the agency a party to the
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action (1.C. § 67-5278).

Boehm did not compiy with any of these procedural

requirements, nor could she ever have done so in the criminal case.
From the beginning of this case, Boehm has sought a judicial ruling
invalidating the SOPs for BAC testing based on ISP's failure to have complied
with the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the testing
methods contained in the SOPs.

But Boehm herself did not comply with the

judicial review provisions of the IAPA. To the state's knowledge, she did not
attempt to pursue any available administrative remedies. 1 I.C. § 67-5271. Nor
did she "institute" any "proceedings for review or declaratory judgment" by filing a
timely petition in the district court of the appropriate county and naming ISP as a
party to the action.

I.C. §§ 67-5272, 67-5273, 67-5278.

Instead, Boehm has

attempted to have the SOPs invalidated as a basis for excluding her breath test
result in the criminal case. Nothing in the IAPA or in any other statute, including
I.C. § 18-8004, enables Boehm to challenge the validity of ISP's action in this
forum and in this manner.

Boehm's attempt to do so is, in her own words,

The state confesses is not aware of any specific administrative remedy by
which Boehm could challenge the validity of ISP's adoption of the SOPs and
methods for BAC testing contained therein. Although I.C. § 18-8002A(7) allows
for an administrative hearing when a person's driver's license has been
suspended as a result of failing a BAC test, failure of ISP to comply with the
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving the methods for BAC testing is
not one of the grounds upon which the license suspension may be vacated. In
addition, I.C. § 67-5278 appears to contemplate that the validity of an agency
rule may be challenged in an action for declaratory judgment, without the
necessity of exhausting administrative remedies. See also Asarco, Inc. v. State,
138 Idaho 719, 69 P.3d 139 (2003) (mining companies did not have to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of validity of state
agency's action in issuing a total maximum daily load limit without complying with
rulemaking requirements of the IAPA).
1
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nothing more than an attempt to make "an end-run around the requirements" of
the IAPA. (Appellant's brief, p.18.)
Because there is no statute that authorizes Boehm to raise ISP's
noncompliance with the rulemaking requirements of the !APA as a defense in the
criminal case, Boehm lacked standing to bring the challenge and both the lower
courts and this Court are without jurisdiction to consider it.

See Laughy, 149

Idaho at 870, 243 P.3d at 1058 ("Without an enabling statute, the district court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction" to review agency action.). If the IAPA applies to
ISP's actions in approving methods for breath testing, it also applies to bar
Boehm's attempt to challenge those actions in the criminal case.

3.

Even If This Court Entertains The Merits Of Boehm's Challenge To
ISP's Approval Of BAC Testing Methods, Correct Application Of
The Law Shows The SOPs Are Not Rules And, As Such, No
Formal Rulemaking Was Required

The legislature has given ISP authority to prescribe by rule "[w]hat testing
is required to complete evidentiary testing" for alcohol concentration under I.C. §
18-8002A and "[w]hat calibration or checking of testing equipment must be
performed to comply with the department's requirements." I.C. § 18-8002(3)(a),
(b ).

Pursuant to this authority, ISP has promulgated administrative "Rules

Governing Alcohol Testing." See Idaho Administrative Code (IDAPA) 11.03.01,

et seq.

Relevant to this appeal is IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03, which governs the

administration of breath alcohol testing. Specifically, the rule provides:
03.
Administration. Breath tests shall be administered
in conformity with standards established by the department.
Standards shall be developed for each type of breath testing
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instrument used in Idaho, and such standards shall be issued in the
form of analytical methods and standard operating procedures.
IDAPA 11.03.01 .14.03. Pursuant to its plain language - and consistent with the
requirements of I.C. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004(4) - this rule leaves to ISP the
task of developing standards for the administration of breath tests and of issuing
such standards "in the form of analytical methods and standard operating
procedures." Nowhere in this rule or in the legislative mandate of I.C. §§ 188002A and 18-8004(4) is there any requirement that the SOPs themselves be
established as rules in compliance with the IAPA.
On

appeal,

Boehm

does

not

challenge

the

validity

of

IDAPA

11.03.01 .14.03 or contend that that rule, which expressly authorizes ISP to
establish methods for breath testing and issue them in the form of SOPs, was
improperly properly promulgated. Instead, she argues that the SOPs themselves
meet the legal definition of an agency "rule" and, therefore, compliance with the
formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA was required.
pp.18-24.)

(Appellant's brief,

This Court should decline to entertain the merits of Boehm's

argument.
Even if this Court does consider Boehm's challenge to the validity of IS P's
action in adopting the SOPs without engaging in formal rulemaking, the
challenge fails because the SOPs are not agency "rules" under the applicable
law.
An agency action is a rule only where the action in question meets all of
six characteristics. Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723, 69 P.3d 139, 143
(2003). Those characteristics include that the action in question "prescribes a
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legal standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute,"
"expresses agency policy not previously expressed," and "is an interpretation of
law or general policy."

kL

see also I.C. § 67-5201(19) (definition of "Rule").

Where an agency merely carries forth its assigned task without creating
additional legal requirements or interpreting law or general policy it does not
create rules subject to the procedures of the IAPA. See Sons and Daughters of
Idaho, Inc. v. Idaho Lottery Comm'n., 142 Idaho 659, 663-64, 132 P.3d 416, 42021 (2006) (Gaming Update not a rule where it did not prescribe a legal standard
but merely explained existing rules); Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. Beacom, 131
Idaho 569, 570-72, 961 P.2d 660, 661-63 (1998) (adoption of tax form to carry
out required function of self-reporting taxes not rulemaking function).
Applying the above principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already
concluded that the rulemaking requirements of the !APA do "not apply when the
Idaho state police approves the methods for determining an individual's alcohol
concentration." State v. Alford, 139 Idaho 595, 597, 83 P.3d 139, 141 (Ct. App.
2004) (emphasis added). In Alford, the defendant sought to exclude his BAC test
result on the basis that ISP did not comply with the rulemaking requirements of
the IAPA when it approved the use of the Alco-Sensor Ill, the breath-testing
device used in Alford's case.

kl

at 597-98, 83 P.3d at 141-42.

Citing the

characteristics of agency rules identified by the Idaho Supreme Court in Asarco,
supra, the Court of Appeals determined "the Idaho state police action approving

the use of the Alco-Sensor Ill was not rulemaking" because it neither prescribed
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new

nor

or

any law. Id.

court

The DUI statute already prescribes the legal standard limiting an
individual's alcohol concentration. Alford has failed to demonstrate
that any Idaho state police policy was expressed, or that any law or
policy was interpreted, by the approval of the Alco-Sensor Ill.
Instead, the Idaho state police properly carried out a statutory duty
to authorize the use of certain breath-testing equipment by law
enforcement agencies. In doing so, it identified equipment that it
found to be suitable for such purpose. It did not create additional
legal requirements. Thus, the state was not required to provide
evidence of Idaho state police compliance with IAPA in approving
the use of the Alco-Sensor 111.

kl at 598,

83 P.3d at 142.

Boehm has not even cited Alford, much less attempted to distinguish it.
Nor can she. Just as the approval of breath-testing equipment is not rulemaking,
neither is the approval of methods to conduct such testing according to the
standards of I.C. § 18-8004(4). As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals in
Alford, I.C. § 18-8004 "already prescribes the legal standard limiting an
individual's alcohol concentration." Alford, 139 Idaho at 598, 83 P.3d at 142.
The methods for BAC testing set forth in the SOPs do not prescribe any new
legal standard for DUI, nor do they interpret any existing law or policy. To the
contrary, the state police action in adopting the SOPs was merely the carrying
out of the legislative directive to approve methods for BAC testing pursuant to the
statute. While compliance with the methods so approved is a prerequisite to the
admissibility of breath test results in the absence of expert testimony, this legal
requirement exists by virtue of the enabling statute itself, see I.C. § 18-8004(4),
not because of any action on the part of ISP.

27

The methods for BAC testing set forth in the SOPs do not create any
binding law or policy; they are merely procedural standards that, if followed by
law enforcement, permit a BAC test result to be introduced in a criminal

proceeding with the necessity of expert testimony pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4).
Because the SOPs do not themselves prescribe or interpret any law, they are not
"rules" to which the formal rulemaking requirements of the IAPA apply. Boehm's
arguments to the contrary are without merit and do not establish any basis to
exclude her BAC test results from trial. 2

IV.
Boehm Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Withdraw Her
Guilt Plea Based On The United State Su reme Court's Recent Decision In
Missouri v. McNeel
A.

Introduction
Boehm argues on appeal the district court erred in upholding the trial

court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea because "McNeely
changed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a fashion that affected the validity
of Idaho's warrantless breath testing and implied consent scheme and the
defendant should have been given a chance to raise the issue."

(Appellant's

brief, p.24.) Boehm's argument fails. Correct application of the law supports the

Even if compliance with the rulemaking requirements of the IAPA in approving
the methods for BAC testing contained in the SOPs were a prerequisite to the
expedient admissibility of BAC test results under I.C. § 18-8004(4), the inability of
the state to show such compliance would not, by itself, be grounds for excluding
the test result. "Rather, the State, as a second option, may call an expert witness
to establish the reliability of the test, thereby making test results admissible."
State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 737, 264 P.3d 75, 78 (Ct. App. 2011) (citation
omitted); see also I.C. § 18-8004(4).
3 Missouri v. McNeely,_ U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).
2
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lower courts' determinations that implied consent is still a valid exception to the
warrant requirement and that Boehm impliedly consented to a breath test in this
case.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review applicable to a decision rendered by a district court

in its intermediate appellate capacity is set forth in Section I.B., supra, and is
incorporated herein by reference.
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d
775, 780-781 (Ct App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v.
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,
869 P.2d 571 (Ct App. 1994).

C.

Boehm Has Failed To Establish The McNeely Opinion Provided A Just
Reason For The Withdrawal Her Guilty Plea
Motions to withdraw a guilty plea are governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which

provides:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition
of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit
the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.
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Pursuant Rule 33(c), a motion to withdraw made before sentencing may
be liberally granted, but must be granted only if the defendant proves either that
the plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made or that there is
another just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea.

State v. Hanslovan, 147

Idaho 530, 535-36, 211 P.3d 775, 780-81 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v.
Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). Because
the opinion in McNeely did not, as Boehm contends, invalidate Idaho's implied
consent statute, Boehm has failed to show the court abused its discretion in
denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, finding the McNeely case was
"distinguishable" from the circumstances of Boehm's case. (Tr., p.74, Ls.17-18.)
As discussed below, because the decision in Missouri v. McNeely did not
eliminate implied consent as it pertains to evidentiary testing of individuals who
are believed to be driving under the influence, Boehm has failed to establish the
denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea on the basis of new law was in
error.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v.
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870,873, 11 P.3d 489,492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); see also State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).)

Consent is such an

exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied
consent statute, I.C. § 18-8002(1). State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160
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P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007); State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907-08, 243 P.3d
1093, 1095-96 (Ct. App. 2010).

Under that statute "the State is entitled to

conduct blood or breath-alcohol concentration tests of drivers suspected of DUI,
and neither a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination nor his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches is violated by such
testing if it is conducted in a reasonable manner." State v. Green, 149 Idaho
706, 709, 239 P.3d 811, 814 (Ct. App. 2010); see also State v. Wagner, 149
Idaho 268, 270, 233 P.3d 199, 201 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing I.C. § 18-8002(1 )).
By accepting the privilege of driving on Idaho's roadways, Boehm
impliedly consented to evidentiary testing to determine her alcohol concentration,
provided such "testing [was] administered by a peace officer with reasonable
grounds for suspicion of DUI." LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 909, 243 P.3d at 1097
(citing State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712, 184 P.3d 215, 218 (Ct. App. 2008);
I.C. § 18-8002(1 )). It is undisputed that, at the time Officer Neal administered the
breath test to Haynes in this case, he had reasonable suspicion that Boehm was
driving under the influence:

She smelled like alcohol, she was "swaying back

and forth" and "slurring her words," and she failed field sobriety tests. (R., p.21.)
It is also undisputed that the officer conducted the evidentiary testing in a
reasonable manner: He read out loud the ALS advisories for Boehm and asked
her if she understood the form. (R., p.22.) The officer checked Boehm's mouth
and monitored her for the required observation period and then administered the
test. (Id.) Because Officer Neal had reasonable suspicion of DUI, and because
the record shows the officer acted reasonably in administering the evidentiary
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testing, the warrantless testing was justified by Boehm's implied consent to
submit to such testing as a condition of driving on Idaho's roads.
Boehm argues otherwise.

Specifically she argues that, after the U.S.

Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely,_ U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552
(2013), implied consent is no longer a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. (Appellant's brief, pp.26-36.) Boehm's assertion that McNeely - a
case addressing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement
- did away with the implied consent exception to the warrant requirement, or rewrote Idaho's implied consent statute, does not withstand scrutiny.
This Court has clearly stated that consent and exigent circumstances are

different exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160

P .3d at 741 ("Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable exception here;
consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement."). The
Supreme Court of the United States recognized this as well in McNeely. In that
case the only question before the Court was "whether the natural metabolization
of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual
blood testing in all drunk-driving cases." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556. The Court
held that "exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on
the totality of the circumstances."

Id.

Thus, the issue was limited to

"nonconsensual blood testing" (emphasis added) and the holding was limited to
the exigent circumstances exception. Thus, consensual breath tests, such as at
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were

1n

or

in

In arguing that implied consent is no longer a valid exception to the
warrant requirement, Boehm summarizes the McNeely holding as follows: "[A]
warrantless evidentiary test in a DUI case is presumptively unconstitutional, and
a person does have the right to refuse to do the test until a warrant has been
secured or an exception to the warrant requirement exists." (Appellant's brief,
p.30.)

Even assuming, without conceding, that McNeely overruled Idaho

precedent holding that a driver has no right to revoke his or her implied consent
to warrantless evidentiary testing, it did not invalidate the implied consent
exception in toto.

To the contrary, in addressing whether a case-by-case

analysis under the exigency exception would "undermine the governmental
interest in preventing and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses," the Court
specifically observed that states would still "have a broad range of legal tools to
enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAG evidence without undertaking
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws," including "implied consent laws."
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1565-66.

The Court also cited with approval its prior

decision in North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), which held that
evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a blood test under implied consent laws
is constitutionally admissible evidence of his guilt. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566.
Thus, far from holding that the state may not legally imply consent by a motorist,
the Court apparently endorsed implied consent laws.
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In addition, to the extent McNeely compels the conciusion that a driver
may revoke his or her implied consent to warrantless BAC testing, such
conclusion is irrelevant under the facts of this case.

Unlike McNeely, who

refused to submit to evidentiary testing, Boehm submitted without objection to the
breath test in this case. (R., pp.17, 22.) Having done so, and having otherwise
impliedly consented to evidentiary testing as a condition of using Idaho's roads,
Boehm cannot successfully complain that the warrantless testing violated her
constitutional rights.
Implied consent is an exception to the warrant requirement different than
actual consent, such that the state does not have to prove that a motorist who
submitted to a BAC test under implied consent gave actual consent.

State v.

Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 409-10, 973 P.2d 758, 761-62 (Ct. App. 1999)
(argument that "consent ... was involuntary is of no consequence because
[motorist] had impliedly consented"). The argument that implied consent must
also meet the requirements of actual consent such as voluntariness has been
"roundly rejected." LeClercq, 149 Idaho at 911-12, 243 P.3d at 1099-100. It is
quite clear in the law that application of the implied consent exception is not
contingent upon the motorist having provided actual consent as well. Because
the breath test in this case was justified by Boehm's implied consent, the state
did not have to demonstrate that Boehm's actual consent was voluntary.
Because Boehm has failed to establish a change in the law governing
implied consent which would have justified the withdrawal of her guilty plea, the
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district court's appellate decision affirming the magistrate's order denying
Boehm's' motion to withdraw her guilty piea shouid be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
intermediate appellate decision affirming Boehm's convictions for misdemeanor
DUI and DWP.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of September, 2014, served
two true and correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by placing
the copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
JAY W. LOGSDON
Kootenai County
Public Defender's Office
Dept. PD
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000

NLS/pm

35

